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Review of Michael Billig, Freudian Repression
Abstract
In Freudian Repression Michael Billig praises Freud for identifying the central concept of repression and for
articulating his ideas in a clear and compelling way. In fact, he calls Freud "the greatest of all psychologists" (p.
261). But Billig points out, convincingly, that Freud never explained how repression works. Freud does offer
metaphorical explanations, in terms of "censors" shielding one part of the self from threatening thoughts, but
Billig argues that these explanations are both vague and conceptually unsatisfying.
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In Freudian Repression Michael Billig praises Freud for identifying the central 
concept of repression and for articulating his ideas in a clear and compelling way.  In 
fact, he calls Freud “the greatest of all psychologists” (p. 261).  But Billig points out, 
convincingly, that Freud never explained how repression works.  Freud does offer 
metaphorical explanations, in terms of “censors” shielding one part of the self from 
threatening thoughts, but Billig argues that these explanations are both vague and 
conceptually unsatisfying. 
 Billig suggests that an adequate account of repression should avoid Freud’s 
emphasis on biological drives and psychological hydraulics.  Drawing on classic ideas 
from Bakhtin and Wittgenstein, plus more contemporary work from Gergen (1994), 
Harré (1995) and others, Billig offers a social constructionist account of repression that 
captures Freud’s brilliant insight but leaves behind his metaphysics.  In brief, Billig 
argues that “we push away disturbing thoughts in much the same way as we avoid 
troublesome topics in conversation” (p. 38).  Repression is accomplished through speech, 
in social context, as people systematically shift conversation or thoughts away from 
threatening topics. 
 Freudian Repression has many strengths.  Billig takes Freud seriously, praising 
his penetrating insights, but he does not hesitate to point out Freud’s shortcomings.  The 
book also follows Freud in being clearly written and engaging.  Billig weaves several of 
Freud’s case studies into his text, using them as evidence for his own arguments.  In 
addition to pushing the argument forward, these cases make the text more accessible and 
teach the reader interesting things about Freud and his times.  Billig’s social 
constructionist account of repression also moves away from biological reductionism and 
self-contained individualism, toward a more dialogic account of the person, which many 
find a promising direction (e.g., Harré, 1995; Shotter, 1993). 
 Nonetheless, completely replacing biological drives with linguistic practices 
seems a stretch.  As Billig describes, Freudian repression depends on a distinction 
between preconscious and unconscious.  While we can access preconscious thoughts just 
by paying attention, we keep repressed thoughts out of consciousness for a reason.  There 
is desire behind the repressed thoughts, and motivation to hide that desire.  On a non-
biological, social constructionist account, what accounts for such desire and motivation?  
Billig often describes repression as mere distraction—i.e., when an opportunity arises to 
say something rude, we distract ourselves and others by changing the topic.  He argues 
that anyone who uses language commonly encounters opportunities to be rude, and he 
concludes that repression must be universal.  But rudeness and distraction do not seem 
powerful enough concepts to explain the motivation behind repression. 
 In response to this issue, Billig suggests that we must change our whole account 
of the person.  Metaphors, like seeing motivation and desire as “behind” our thoughts, in 
some primal part of the individual, can skew our theorizing in a biological and 
individualistic direction.  Instead, we must see that emotions themselves are not just inner 
states but also social products.  Billig does not work it out fully, but he points toward a 
Wittgensteinian account that would capture concepts like motivation and desire in social 
and not individual terms.  At times Billig uses such an account convincingly in his 
analyses of Freud’s cases.  He shows, for example, how Freud consistently interpreted 
Little Hans’ statements in terms of his “desire” for his mother—while ignoring (as 
“natural”) the desires that Hans’ parents were imposing on him.  Billig also begins to 
connect his social constructionist account to the macro-social concept of ideology, 
arguing that ideology can be construed as collective repression in some cases. 
 In order to make this social constructionist account work, however, I would argue 
that Billig needs a more complex account of language use.  His account of repression 
focuses on how language represents information.  Drawing on conversation analysis, he 
describes how “little words” (like but and anyway) allow people to change the topic away 
from threatening issues to benign ones.  His social account of repression focuses almost 
entirely on speakers “opening up and closing down topics” (p. 52).   Although this 
process certainly happens, there is much more to language use than topic management.  
Speakers use language to accomplish social actions and to adopt social positions, and in 
doing so they foreground some desires and background others (e.g., Crapanzano, 1992; 
Silverstein, 1998).  Billig could strengthen his case that repression is “dialogical, not 
biological” if he attended to the complex relational patterns that can be enacted and 
transformed through language use.  He nonetheless deserves credit for moving us toward 
an understanding of repression as social action.  
 
References 
Crapanzano, V. (1992).  Hermes' dilemma and Hamlet's desire.  Cambridge, MA:   
Harvard University. 
Gergen, K. (1994). Realities and relationships. Cambridge: Harvard University. 
Harré, R. (1995).  The necessity of personhood as embodied being.  Theory &  
Psychology, 5, 369-373. 
Shotter, J. (1993).  Conversational realities.  London:  Sage. 
Silverstein, M. (1998).  The improvisational performance of "culture" in realtime  
discursive practice.  In K. Sawyer (Ed.), Improvisation. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
